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IN Tl II; ! fTAI 1 COURT OF APPEALS 
--V..TJ MCE CITY, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. 
Case No. 20100203 
Defendant/Appellant. •: 
SUIV1MAK\ OF THE ARGUMENT 
1;nvi wa; ch:ir;ed w it h Driving IJnder the Influence of AIc^noi. ;.; v.;.- -. v 
misdemeanor, in violation of"Utah Code A;I;K , <•-/ • l"iled amotion to suppress the 
evidence at m. .r: .• • - .:-:r:;: tha-. the anon> ^oas tip pro\'ided to police was insufficient to 
.* .\*v\ a reasonable suspicion to slop and detain him .: uiwr./i-iut;!; *.su "' *"; lev .^., 
both Mr. Street and the I r\ arg*i.v .: .. . > a.-' ! : memoranda addressing the three-part test 
. : :- •« - (..-:• *•> KavsvilU City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231 (I u:i Ap; 
contends that the O n . lor tiie first time, argued a.>, .n aw ; v :. -. outlined in Mulcahy, 
should be abonsiu^ . • ' •<•> Mder totality of circumstances test, As explained below, Mr. 
Street contends that the City iailcd to preserve that issue lur re\ icu .•" ' . - • j * e! . -id 
therefore, this Court should noi eiiiciLim llini atwirnent. 
The City also contends that the Utah Supreme Court eliniinalec me './/..., w- • rt 
test for analyzing anonymous tips. As also arguec :».-• - . v wv* asserts that the Utah 
Supreme Court iia> >t»ti abolished '1^ ihree-part test for analyzing anonymous tips, and has 
1 
instead applied the Mulcahy analysis in State v. Roybal, 232 P.3d 1016 (Utah 2010). 
I. THE CITY FAILED TO PRESERVE FOR REVIEW IN THIS COURT THE 
ARGUMENT TO ABANDON THE THREE-PART MULCAHY TEST. 
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal." 
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,111, 10 P.3d 346. A party cannot circumvent that rule by 
"mere[ly] mention [ing] ... an issue without introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal 
authority"; such a "mere mention" "does not preserve that issue for appeal." State v. Brown, 856 
P.2d 358, 361 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (internal quotations omitted). The preservation requirement is 
based on the premise that, "in the interest of orderly procedure, the trial court ought to be given 
an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it." Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at 
T[ 11, 10 P.3d 346 (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, an objection "must at least be 
raised to a level of consciousness such that the trial [court] can consider it." Brown, 856 P.2d at 
361 (internal quotations omitted). 
"As a general rule, appellate courts will not consider an issue, including a constitutional 
argument, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or the 
case involves exceptional circumstances." State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah 
Ct.App.1993). In order to preserve an issue for appeal, it "must be raised in a timely fashion, 
must be specifically raised such that the issue is sufficiently raised to a level of consciousness 
before the trial court, and must be supported by evidence or relevant legal authority." State v. 
Schultz, 2002 UT App 366, f 19, 58 P.3d 879 (quotations and citations omitted). "The trial court 
is considered 'the proper forum in which to commence thoughtful and probing analysis' of 
issues." Brown, 856 P.2d at 360 (citation omitted). The preservation rule allows "the trial court 
2 
an opportuni ty to J U ^ . ^ ;.u - ..i. > : • * ; ! :•-' arn^priate, correct it.' " State v. Craw, 2002 
? ' ' *" €; iu, 4o P.3d 230 (quotingState v. IIolgau\ 2000 I T 74. r 11 in 4 .... . . , - ) . 
Addi t ional ly , M[f] ailing to argue an issue ana p v - . i cj ."•>• * • •* ••! n e e in that i c rum denies the 
i =... -. L ^L: .. *; -p .y\". • "• • • -ake anv findings of fact or conclusion^ of law1 pertinent to the 
c la imed error." Brown. 856 P.2d at 3ou (caution v»nhtted\ 
At the trial court ie\ ei. .K * r. -* • - ••'-.: •. fo- rcicction of the three-part Mulcahy test 
'*: •**• • -iaiiiy o i i n c circumstances analysis. );i ihe contrary, ill its Supplemental 
M e m o r a n d u m In Opposit ion to Defendant .> A:-,-.. I ••• -uiyivs'. hereh^lVr "r;<\ *s 
Memorandum L the * iiy idenfilial Ihc proper test to apph to an ana!>si> of an anonymor.s tin as 
the "three factor test" articulated in Kaysville City v. Mulcany . v-ij i\_o _.* •. _ - M'-
]Q97\ The City then set ionn LIVL^  . v; . ._ . .* ' • -n . uf the test and contended that 
appii.: .'• ' •;"'"•. * three-part test here supported their position. Likewise, at oral argument, the 
City again "[maintained its position undci .vui._aue\isic; - \ .:rei.»'.g liui app;^:u^n oi me 
three-pan lesi sup;- * .} 
Given the state of the record, Mr. Street contends that the Qty failed to preserve I Ins 
argument for appeal. 
II. THE U I AH SUPREME COURT DOES NOT REJECT TliE MULCAHY THREE-
PART TEST IN FAVOR OK A TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES APPROACH 
IN ANONYMOUS TIP CASES 
The trial eourt. at oral argument, admittedly asked defensle counsel if it was approp; 
*o "reject the three-prong approach from Mulcahey(sic)... in favojr of the flexible approach 
offered by the totality of circumstances test. . . ." Neither party, hdwever, briefed the issue and 
the City never affirmatively argued the point. State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 361 (I Uah 
Ct.App.l993)("mere[ly] mention fing] ... an issue without introducing supporting evidence or 
relevant legal authority" does not preserve that issue for appeal.") 
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In its brief, the City contends that Utah Supreme Court rejected the Mulcahy analysis in 
two cases, State v. Roybal, 232 P.3d 1016 (Utah 2010) and State v. Saddler, 104 P.3d 1265 (Utah 
2004), in favor of a totality of circumstances analysis in reasonable suspicion anonymous tip 
cases. While the Supreme Cburt describes the analysis as a totality of circumstances review, it is 
clear that the Court applied Mulcahy factors in Roybal, while the facts of Saddler do not apply to 
this case.2 
A review of the Roybal decision reveals that the Utah Supreme Court analyzed the tip in 
conformance with the Mulcahy factors and even ends its analysis with a favorable citation to 
Mulcahy: 
Looking to the totality of the circumstances in the instant case, we believe 
the 911 call was sufficient to provide the dispatcher with reasonable 
suspicion that Roybal was driving under the influence. Irrespective of the 
fact that McCaine was Roybal's live-in girlfriend, she was an identified 
citizen-informant who is presumptively reliable. Her personal involvement 
with Roybal, on its face, neither weakens, nor strengthens, that 
presumption; we must consider the unique facts of this case. She gave her 
full name and address, thereby fully exposing herself to liability for 
fraudulent allegations. Further, she did not call with the intention of 
reporting Roybal's drunk driving but to request help removing him from 
her home. Her statement that Roybal had been drinking was made 
off-handedly and with the acknowledgment that she, too, had been 
drinking, which indicates that her remark was simply a statement of fact 
and lacked an ulterior motive. In addition, she provided specific details of 
her first-hand observations. McCaine reported to the dispatcher that she 
had been with Roybal, that they had been drinking together, and that he 
had just left. She also described his vehicle with partial license plate 
number, the area he was in, and the direction he was heading. Coupled 
with the fact that McCaine was noticeably intoxicated on the phone, the 
dispatcher could make the reasonable inference that Roybal was similarly 
2 Unlike this case, Roybal involved a known, identified informant, Roybafs girlfriend, 
who observed Roybal in a face-to-face encounter, described how both parties had consumed 
alcohol and were intoxicated and detailed the vehicle and location where Roybal had driven his 
vehicle. 
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i:uo\ieated. and was driving. Unlike the court of appeals, we do not 
believe that it was necessary for McCaine to report how much or how long 
Roybal had been drinking, the type of drink consumed, or fiis weight. 
1
 'ndoubtedly these detail* would have strengthened the report. However, 
because McCaine said Roybal had been drinking with her J and she wras 
clearly intoxicated, it was reasonable for the dispatcher to infer that Roybal 
was likewise intoxicated. Thus, the details provided in the call, together 
with their reasonable inferences, given from a reliable, identified 
citizen-informant, were sufficient for the dispatcher to fodn a reasonable 
suspicion that Roybal was driving while intoxicated... 
Once a reasonable suspicion is reached by the originator of the 
information-in this case, the dispatcher-the responding police officer is 
entitled to rely on the information unless the officer's personal 
observations or interaction with the suspect present indications to the 
contrary. That is to say, if the suspect's actions are not inconsistent with 
the reasonable suspicion, the police officer may pursue the suspect and 
stop him or her immediately. See Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 
234 (I !tah C"t.App.1997) ("An offi eer receiving a dispatched 
message ma)7 take it at face value and act o:i it iorthw i«h." (internal 
quotation marks omitted U (emphasis added) 
State v. Roybal 232 P.3d 1016, 1023-24 (Utah 201 r,). 
In Saddlei\ i:^ K. Un Supreme Court was asked to decide w hether the M ulcc ihy factors 
should hi.1 extended to analyzing probable cause determinations when police rely upon 
confidential informants to obtain search warrants. There are vast differences between police 
officers ai ticulating probable cause elements in a search vv at: rai it aflida1' n l w 1 lich is review ed 
and analyzed by a magistrate, and a reasonable suspicion determinalion based simply on 
information given to poiiee by an anonymous iin^imam. ;n mc >ca?e; \ .:. i.d \ . *»^  . 
!V\iriV T'pvoach is necessary for at least two reasons: 
1. "'Affidavits' are normally drafted by nonlawyers in thfc midst and haste 
of a criminal investigation. Technical requirements havejno proper place 
in this area;" and 
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2. "[Gjiven the informal often hurried context in which it must be applied, 
the built in subtleties of a formal test are particularly unlikely to assist 
magistrates in determining probable cause." 
Saddler, 104 P.3d at 1268. 
The anonymous tip analysis in a reasonable suspicion case is very different. First, police 
often develop probable cause determinations over time, often with the help of confidential 
informants.3 Unlike reasonable suspicion decisions, police must first obtain permission from a 
neutral magistrate, who can question the officer about the reliability of the informant. 
Anonymous informant information in the context of reasonable suspicion determination has no 
such neutral determination. Rather, police who act on the information, make the unilateral 
determination about reasonable suspicion based on what is reported to them, without review by a 
neutral magistrate. The Mulcahy analysis was developed to give courts guidance when analyzing 
anonymous informant, reasonable suspicion tip cases. That test properly weighs anonymous 
information with detail necessary to support a stop, while also giving police necessary flexibility 
to make reasonable suspicion stops when they confirm or corroborate information provided by 
the informant. This Court should maintain that analysis because it gives courts the flexibility to 
evaluate reasonable, commonsense factors in determining reasonable suspicion, when the 
information is provided by an anonymous informant. 
3
 Saddler is an excellent example of the type and length of investigation resulting in a 
probable cause affidavit. In Saddler, the police officer affiant knew the confidential informant 
for over one year, observed that the informant had connections in the drug world, received 
detailed first-hand information from the informant about observation of drugs and drug sales in 
Saddler's home, and provided detailed information about Saddler's hours of operation. 
Additionally, the affiant personally observed short term traffic consistent with drug sales and 
conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle leaving the premises and discovered a personal possession 
quantity of drugs in the vehicle. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Street requests that this Court reverse the decision of the trial court denying his 
motion to suppress and remand this case for proceedings consistent vldth that decision. 
Dated this (/? day of October, 2010. 
KTt^y 
ICHARD P. MAURO 
Attorney for Appellant, JCeith Street 
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